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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OUTSOURCE RECEIVABLES
MANAGEMENT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

)
)
';)
)

vs.

)

IRENE C. RIGBY,

)

Defendant/Appellant.

Appeals Case No. 20050985-CA
Fifth District
Court No. 050500513

)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (j) , and
pursuant to Rules 3 (a) and 4 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1.

Defendant/Appellant has failed to marshal

the evidence against the factual basis for the trial court's
ruling.
Issue
discretion

2.

The

when

it

trial

court

entered
1

did

not

judgment

abuse

its

against

Defendant/Appellant.
Issue

3.

Defendant/Appellant

may

not

rely

on

evidence not made part of the record on appeal.
Issue 4.
pay

the

Defendant/Appellant should be ordered to

reasonable

attorney's

fees

and

costs

of

Plaintiff/Appellee for filing this frivolous appeal.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

ProMax

Development Corporation v. Matt son, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah
App.

1997) .

The

appellant

has

a duty

to

"present, in

comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at [the hearing] which supports the very
findings [he] resists."
117.

State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75,

"If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate

court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis
alone."

Ibid.
The District Court's legal conclusions are reviewed

for an abuse of discretion.

State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT

75, 518.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
General contract law requires that once the trial
2

court determines a valid contract exists, the contract must be
enforced.

"The only thing...that the courts are concerned with

is to ascertain the intention of the parties to any contract,
and,

when

this

is ascertained,

intention admits of no escape."

the

duty

to

enforce

such

Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99

P. 460, 463 (Utah 1909), cited in Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT
App 34, fll.
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 (2) states: " Unless parties
to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum."
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure

states:
"(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in
a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay,
it shall award just damages, which may include single
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.
The court may order that the damages be paid by the
party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
3

increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that
will benefit only the party filing the appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal follows a trial held on September 2 6,
2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Court
Judge.

The Defendant/Appellant objects to the court's entry

of judgment against her as prayed in Plaintiff's Complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Zion Eye Institute provided medical services to

Defendant/Appellant, Ms. Rigby, on various occasions before
October 26, 2000.

(Record on Appeal, page 2.)

2. Ms. Rigby signed a form in which she agreed that
she was "financially responsible for all charges incurred."
(Record on Appeal page 4, copy included in Addendum.)

Ms.

Rigby has admitted that she signed this form (Record on Appeal
page 8) . Ms. Rigby made some arguments at trial concerning the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract, but the
trier of fact concluded that the contract was validly and
properly signed.
3.

Ms. Rigby became eligible for Medicare coverage

in November, 1999.

(Record on Appeal page 12, and page 42,

Transcript page 6 line 24-25.)
4

Ms. Rigby apparently believed

that her Medicare coverage could apply retroactively to cover
charges incurred before her eligibility date of November 1,
1999, but it did not.
page 7 lines 1-6.)

(Record on Appeal page 42, Transcript
She also had various other

coverage during the periods of service.

insurance

(Record on Appeal page

42, Transcript page 6 lines 3 through 10; page 7, lines 14
through 15.)
Zion Eye Institute billed Ms. Rigby7s insurance

4.

companies, but a principal balance of $5,337.32 remains owing
for her treatments.

(Record on Appeal page 2; page 42,

Transcript page 6 lines 3-12, 16-19.)

Ms. Rigby provided no

evidence at trial to dispute the accuracy of this balance.
5.
claim

Zion Eye Institute subsequently assigned its

to Outsource

Receivables

Management

for

collection.

(Record on appeal page 2.)
5.
page

Ms. Rigby states in her brief at the bottom of

1 that

during

the

trial

"Defendant

stated

that

she

believed that there were errors in the billing statement."
However, this statement does not appear anywhere in the record
on appeal or in the transcript of the hearing.

Page 2 of the

brief of Ms. Rigby outlines her claims of errors in the billing
statement.

None of these "errors" were presented to the Court
5

at the time of trial, nor were they a part of the record before
the trial court.

The Court therefore cannot consider these

"errors" as facts in this appeal. The documents marked by Ms.
Rigby as Exhibits 4 through 8 of her brief were not part of the
record before the trial court; in fact, Exhibits 5, 6, and 7
are specifically dated after the date of the trial on September
26, 2005.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The Defendant/Appellant has the duty to "present,
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at [the hearing] which supports the very
findings [he] resists."
117.

State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75,

"If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate

court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis
alone."

Ibid.

She has failed to meet this burden, and thus

the Court must assume that the factual findings relied upon by
the trial court are supported by the record.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it granted judgment against Defendant/Appellant. The Court
found no reason to refuse to enforce the contract signed by Ms.
Rigby, and she presented no evidence contradicting the amount
claimed as owing by Plaintiff and its assignor, Zion Eye
6

Institute.
3.

Ms. Rigby cannot now bring in evidence which she

did not present to the trial court in support of her appeal.
This Court must rely on the information in the record on appeal
in reviewing the judgment of the trial court.
A.

Pursuant

to

Rule

33

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate Procedure, this Court should order Ms. Rigby to pay
damages to Plaintiff/Appellee for her frivolous appeal, which
is not based upon any facts in evidence before the trial court,
and which has no basis in existing law.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING.
The Defendant/Appellant fails to meet the standard of
appellate review to overturn the trial court's decision.

She

has a duty to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at [the hearing]
which supports the very findings [he] resists."

State of Utah

v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117, quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,
177, 100 P. 3d 1177. "If the marshaling requirement is not met,
the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings
on that basis alone." State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117..
7

Ms. Rigby has not, in "comprehensive and fastidious order,
[marshaled] every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." Moon v.
Moon, 973 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999).

Ms. Rigby has not

even stated the facts in evidence at the trial which support
her position; she certainly has not stated the fact which
support the Court's ruling. Rather, she attempts to bring new
evidence before this Court which was not presented to the trial
court.

Ms. Rigby has likewise failed to expose any "fatal

flaw in the evidence" sufficient to overturn the trial court's
findings. Moon at 437. Ms. Rigbyfs attempt to have this court
reconsider the facts of the case runs counter to this Court's
position that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
ProMax Development Corporation v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255
(Utah App. 1997).

"What appellants cannot do is merely re-

argue the factual case they presented in trial court."

Chen

v. Stewart, at 577.
In cases such as this, where Ms. Rigby has not met
her burden of marshaling the evidence, the Court has stated
that it will ". . . [assume] that the record supports the findings
of the trial court and [this Court] proceeds to a review of the
8

accuracy of the lower court's

conclusions

of law and the

application of that law to the case." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994).
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.
The trial court relied on the existence of a contract
signed by Ms. Rigby in granting judgment against her.

Nothing

in the evidence presented before the trial court suggested that
the contract was not valid and enforceable.

Ms. Rigby was

given the opportunity to explain why the contract should not
be enforced, but she presented no credible evidence challenging
the contract.

Further, Ms. Rigby presented no evidence at all

at trial to dispute the amount claimed by Plaintiff/Appellee
and its assignor.

At page 10, line 22 and following of the

transcript of the trial in this matter, Judge Shumate stated
the amount of the claim, and on page 11, line 4 he then asked
Ms. Rigby point-blank "You tell me why it is that you donft owe
that." After asking Ms. Rigby two more times (on page 15, line
9, and page 16, line 16) if there was anything else she wanted
to tell him, Ms. Rigby provided no evidence to show that the
amount of the claim was incorrect.

The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in granting judgment as prayed, when Ms.

9

Rigby provided no evidence showing that she did not owe the
amount claimed.
III.

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT MAY NOT RELY ON EVIDENCE
NOT MADE PART OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
Ms. Rigby made a choice not to request any documents

or information from Plaintiff, Outsource, or its assignor, Zion
Eye Institute, through the discovery process prior to the trial
of this action.

She provided no evidence to the trial court

which would contradict the amount owed by her on the claim of
Outsource and Zion Eye Institute.
Following the trial, and in her filings with this
Court, she has provided documents purporting to challenge the
balance owed by Ms. Rigby to Outsource for the claim of Zion
Eye Institute.
In considering Ms. Rigbyrs appeal, this Court should
not consider evidence which was not presented to the trial
court.

State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75 127, 29 (Utah 2005);

Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130 551, 63 P.3d
705 (Utah 2002), citing Robinson v. Tripco Inv. Inc., 2000 UT
App 200 12 n.l, 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000) . The bulk of the
information in Ms. Rigbyfs filing with this Court was not
presented to the trial court.

A review of the actual record

10

on appeal, and the transcript, clearly shows what information
was (and was not) presented to the trial court.

And it is

obvious that any documents dated after the trial date of
September 26, 2005, were not before the trial court at the time
of trial.

This Court should disregard all exhibits attached

to Ms. Rigbyfs filing and any argument she makes based upon
those exhibits, and instead rely only on the actual record.
Ms. Rigby had the opportunity to present any evidence to the
trial

court

that

she wished; however,

permitted to add to the record on appeal.

she

cannot

now be

Permitting her to

rely on additional evidence would subvert this Court's stated
position that "it is the trial court's role to assess witness
credibility, given its advantaged position to observe testimony
first hand...."

ProMax Development Corp v. Mattson, 943 P.2d

247, 255 (Utah App. 1997).
While

the

trial

court

handled

this

trial

in

an

informal manner, "This informality does not permit, however,
the abridgement

of basic constitutional provisions

of due

process such as the opportunity to know, cross-examine, explain
or rebut evidence not introduced in open court."

State of

Utah, In the Interest of S.J., H.J., and S.J. 576 P.2d 1280,
1283 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
11

Ms. Rigby had a duty to

present to the trial court any evidence relevant to its ruling.
Having failed to provide that evidence to the trial court, she
cannot now expect this Court to reopen the case and consider
additional evidence which she obtained after the trial.

The

evidence in the record on appeal supports the trial court's
judgment award; no other evidence can or should be considered
in reviewing that award.
ISSUE 4. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT SHOULD BE ORDERED
TO PAY THE REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE FOR FILING THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
Rule 33 (b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
defines a frivolous appeal as one not grounded in fact, not
warranted by

existing

law, or not based

argument

extend,

modify,

to

or

on a good

reverse

existing

faith
law.

Defendant/Appellant, Ms. Rigby, does not rely on existing law
as a basis for her appeal, nor does she ask this Court to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
no law at all in her filings herein.

In fact, she cites

She relies solely upon

facts as the basis for her appeal, and the facts she relies
upon were not in evidence before the trial court.

Her appeal

is therefore not grounded in facts which were before the trial
court.

Ms.

Rigby1s

appeal

meets

every

definition

of

a

frivolous appeal. Plaintiff/Appellant therefore requests that
12

this Court order Ms. Rigby to pay damages for her frivolous
appeal, by ordering her to pay costs and reasonable attorney's
fees as authorized by Rule 33 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Rigby asks this Court to give her another bite at
the apple, by submitting additional evidence which was not
presented to the trial court. She makes no effort to challenge
the ruling of the trial court based on the evidence which was
available at the time of trial. Accordingly, the ruling of the
trial court should be affirmed, and Ms. Rigby should be ordered
to pay the

costs and attorney's

fees on appeal

of the

Plaintiff/Appellee, Outsource Receivables Management, for her
frivolous appeal.

DATED this Q] day of[_AA/_

JUDY mm

, 2006

BI

Attorney for' the
Plainyiff/Appellee
Outsource Receivables Management

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the

5> day of

July, 2006, I served two copies of the attached Brief of the
Plaintiff/Appellee upon Irene C. Rigby, Defendant/Appellant pro
se, by mailing to her by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
Irene C. Rigby
668 East 490 South
Ivins, Utah 84738

Plaintiff/Appellee

14

this Court order Ms. Rigby to pay damages for her frivolous
appeal, by ordering her to pay costs and reasonable attorney's
fees as authorized by Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Rigby asks this Court to give her another bite at
the apple, by submitting additional evidence which was not
presented to the trial court. She makes no effort to challenge
the ruling of the trial court based on the evidence which was
available at the time of trial. Accordingly, the ruling of the
trial court should be affirmed, and Ms. Rigby should be ordered
to

pay

the

costs

and

attorney's

fees

on

appeal

of

the

Plaintiff/Appellee, Outsource Receivables Management, for her
frivolous appeal.
DATED this

day of

, 2006.

JUDY DAWN BARKING
Attorney for the
Plaintiff/Appellee
Outsource Receivables Management
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the

day of

July, 2006, I served two copies of the attached Brief of the
Plaintiff/Appellee upon Irene C. Rigby, Defendant/Appellant pro
se, by mailing to her by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
Irene C. Rigby
668 East 490 South
Ivins, Utah 84738

JUDY DAWN BARKING
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
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EXHIBIT "A"

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY AND SIGN
understand that I am financially responsible for al
larges incurred.
'equest that payment of authorized insurance benefits b6
ade to The Zion Eye Institute for any services furnished
me.
authorize The Zion Eye Institute to release to the Healti
are Financing Administration (HCFA) or my private
urance company and its agents any information needec
determine these benefits.

\ n

ya

,<?

Patient's Signature

/

Date

</

File No. 533431
JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211
Attorney for Plaintiff
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
Telephone: (801) 394-7704
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT

OUTSOURCE RECEIVABLES
MANAGEMENT,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 050500513DC

IRENE C. RIGBY,
SSN ending in 8242
668 East 490 South
Ivins, Utah 84738
Defendant.

Judge:

James L. Shumate

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on September
26, 2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Judge,
presiding.

Plaintiff was represented by its counsel, Judy Dawn

Barking; Defendant was present, appearing pro se. The Court having
heard evidence of the parties, and being fully advised in the
premises, now enters judgment against the Defendant in the amount
of:
The principal sum of $5,337.37;
Prejudgment Interest of $2,297.07;
Accrued costs to date of judgment of $125.00;
TOTAL JUDGMENT: $7,759.44
with interest on the total judgment at the statutory contract rate
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivofous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The
court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needess increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A party may request damages
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or
both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing.

http://www.utcoum.gov/rescmrces/rules/urap/33 htm
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